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The intentional use of biological agents as weapons could
result in deaths in numbers comparable to those expected from
the use of nuclear weapons. It is one of the most significant
terrorism threats (16, 82) and has the potential to catalyze a
general breakdown of society through a loss of human lives,
food, livestock, agriculture, and economy. This form of warfare
has been a threat for centuries and predates scientific under-
standing of microorganisms or disease (44). The biological
agents used for warfare are easily produced and dispersed,
have a delayed onset, cause high rates of morbidity and mor-
tality, and present unique challenges in diagnosis, detection,
and treatment (16). Biological agents are diverse and can be
deployed to contaminate various environmental media includ-
ing air, water, food, soil, and fomites.
The well-known global history of military biowarfare and
terrorism (16, 42–44, 85) has prompted many governments to
prioritize response plans for the event of a biological agent
release in a bioterrorism attack (5, 74). An important compo-
nent to any response plan is an understanding of the survival
rate or viability of the biological agent in the surrounding
environment (82). Bioterrorism events such as the “anthrax
letter” attacks of 2001 (25) have highlighted that the survival
and persistence of a biological agent have a significant impact
on the microbial hazard and its subsequent effects. Microbial
decay and injury will affect decontamination, infection rates,
and encompassing geographic areas. Therefore, knowledge of
microbial ecology and defensive public preparation are impor-
tant factors in limiting bioterrorism-related morbidity and
mortality. The Centers for Disease Control (CDC) prioritizes
potential biological terrorism agents as category A if they re-
quire intensive public preparedness efforts due to the potential
for mass causalities, public fear, and civil disruption (76).
These category A select agents are variola major virus (small-
pox), Bacillus anthracis (anthrax), Yersinia pestis (plague), Clos-
tridium botulinum toxin (botulism), Francisella tularensis (tula-
remia), and the viral hemorrhagic fever agents Arenaviridae
(Lassa fever, Junin-Argentine hemorrhagic fever, and Vene-
zuelan hemorrhagic fever), Bunyaviridae (hantavirus), Filoviri-
dae (Ebola hemorrhagic fever and Marburg hemorrhagic fe-
ver), and Flaviviridae (St. Louis encephalitis and Japanese B
encephalitis).
In an intentional release, exposure may occur by routes in
which the bioagent is not transmitted in nature. The poten-
tial for transmission is a function of transport and persis-
tence in the environment, with the transport probability
based upon both predicted entry ports and other portals not
usually considered significant or lacking in nature. Informa-
tion on the environmental persistence of these agents is
limited but essential for estimating where the greatest en-
vironmental exposure may occur through a risk assessment
framework.
The purpose of this review is to assess the current informa-
tion on the persistence of select agents on the CDC category A
agent list in the environment and its implications in a terrorism
response.
ROUTES OF EXPOSURE
The release of vertebrate pathogens may occur intentionally,
by accident, or by natural release in the bodily fluids of those
infected. All category A agents can be expected to be released
in the bodily fluids of infected persons or animals (Table 1).
The concentration of these agents in these materials can be
significant (Table 2). Most of the agents in nature are primarily
transmitted by insect vectors or through animal contact or
material contaminated by infected animals. The demonstrated
or suspected natural routes of transmission are shown in Table
3. For the bacteria in particular, multiple routes of transmis-
sion are possible, although some may play a minor role in
nature. The agents’ persistence characteristics in aerosols, fo-
mites, and water are detailed in Tables 4, 5, and 6, respectively.
PERSISTENCE IN THE ENVIRONMENT
The maintenance of infectivity by any pathogen outside the
host is dependent on a number of factors including tempera-
ture, relative humidity, desiccation, and UV light. Tempera-
ture has the greatest effect, since the rates of most chemical
and physical processes are dependent upon it. Temperature is
also the most useful parameter for modeling microbial decay
rates for microbes that cannot replicate in the environment.
Relative humidity (and desiccation) is also a significant factor
for survival in air and on fomites (9).
For comparative purposes and to assess long-term exposure
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risks, we calculated inactivation coefficients (Ki) with the fol-
lowing calculation for the titers per unit volume (ml, g, or cubic
meter of air): [log10 reduction (initial titer  final titer/volume
or weight]/total hours of viability (9). Inactivation coefficients
were assumed to be linear functions and were not used to
calculate T90 and T99 values, which are the times required for
the initial titer to decrease by 90% (T90) and 99% (T99); these
values were calculated using the survival curve, which is typi-
cally not linear. Therefore, T90 and T99 values usually under-
estimate viral survival compared to inactivation coefficients (Ki
values). We estimated these from published data tables and/or
figures if available.
Aerosols. Research on category A pathogen survival in aero-
sols is limited, but it is known that most biological agents, with
some exceptions, face decay once exposed to air due mainly to
freezing, dehydration, and UV exposure during the daylight as
well as to many other contributing environmental factors (45,
50). In general, vegetative forms are much more susceptible to
open-air conditions than bacterial spores (Tables 4 and 7) (36,
73, 80).
B. anthracis in its vegetative form usually will not survive for
long outside of a host and will form spores when exposed to
oxygen (26, 88). Early studies on anthrax spores demonstrated
very long survival times (Table 7). One limited study examined
the survival of anthrax spores in outdoor air and showed that
B. anthracis spores retained complete viability when exposed
for several hours during the nighttime (61). This finding is
expected, as spores are highly resistant structures and are at
least 10-fold more resistant at night than during the day (82).
Additional studies examined air for B. anthracis spores and
reported viable DNA over several U.S. cites and in the upper
atmosphere (15, 33, 60). Other studies of survivability in water
and on fomites suggest that the aerosol survival of B. anthracis
spores could be long (24). Many other modeling studies, ani-
mal dose-response models, epidemiological studies, and stud-
ies with surrogate organisms (11, 12, 30, 72, 90) that reveal
qualitative information related to B. anthracis survival in air
are available, but experimental evidence is lacking or is classi-
fied.
Y. pestis exhibited a constant decay rate when it was aero-
solized at an rH of 50% in heart infusion broth (94). An abrupt
loss of viable organisms occurs when rH rises above 50%,
especially to 85%. F. tularensis responded similarly by having
the lowest survival at a high rH. Additional studies found that
the effect of temperature on survival is linear when the rH is
above 85%.
Many of the studies on viral survival exhibited an initial log
die-off within the first few minutes of aerosolization. Vaccinia
virus behaved in this manner, but ultimate survival was deter-
mined by rH and temperature. The T99 was about 9 h even
under the most challenging rH and temperature (40, 41). Be-
cause the Lassa fever virus can be present in pharyngeal se-
cretions and urine for up to 3 to 4 weeks after a patient’s
clinical signs have subsided (65), there is a long window in
which the infective virions can become airborne. An aerosol
study found that 75% of the virus was infective after 4 min at
24°C (81). The Ebola and Marburg filoviruses are not typically
transmitted by aerosols, but laboratory studies with monkeys
demonstrate that the disease could potentially be transmitted
through respirable particles (46, 47, 55). Epidemiological in-
vestigations have found that most human cases occurred due to
direct contact with blood, secretions, or tissues of infected
patients or nonhuman primates (6, 10, 53). The survival of
Japanese B encephalitis virus was shown to be inversely related
TABLE 1. Occurrence of category A select agents in bodily fluids and sewagea
Agent
Occurrence in:
Comment Reference
Urine Feces Saliva Sewage
Bacillus anthracis ? Yes ? Yes ? 70
Brucella abortus Yes ? Yes ? 28
Yersinia pestis ? ? ? Yes 51
Variola major virus (smallpox) Yes ? Yes ? Dermal scrapes 77
Francisella tularensis Antigen Yes ? ? Animals 86
Lassa fever virus Yes ? ? ?
Hantavirus Yes Yes Yes ? Urine, human feces, animal 54
Dengue virus Yes ? ? ? Animals 57
Marburg virus Yes Yes ? ? Animals 18
a ?, no data or unknown.
TABLE 2. Concentration and duration of agent release
Agent Fluid Concn(ml or g) Duration Reference
Variola major
virus
Urine 102–105 19 days 77
Hantavirus Saliva 102 14 days 54
Marburg virus Feces, urine, and
salviaa
102.3–103.3 Throughout
the illness
18
Flaviviruses Urinea 6–103 10 days 57
a Fluid in animals.
TABLE 3. Vehicles for the transmission of category A agents
in nature
Agent
Transmission ina:
Air Water/liquids Soil Fomites
Bacillus anthracis X X X
Yellow fever virus (Flaviviridae)
Francisella tularensis X X X X
Yersinia pestis X
Hantavirus (Bunyaviridae) X X X
Smallpox virus X X
Ebola and Marburg viruses
(Filoviridae)
X
Lassa virus (Arenaviridae) X
a “X” indicates transmission.
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TABLE 4. Survival of category A biological agents as aerosols
Disease and agent (exptl
conditions, suspending medium) Initial titer
Temp
(°C) rH (%) T90 (h) T99 (h) Ki Reference
Anthrax
Bacillus anthracis (multiple
hours in night air)
Complete
recovery
62
Bacillus anthracis 4.64  107
HPACe
82
Tularemia
Francisella tularensis SCHU S5
(PBSb)
1.5  1011 CFU/ml 40 Ambient 1.02 2.05 0.97 27
29 Ambient 3.97 7.93 0.25
7 Ambient 2.68 5.35 0.37
24 85 1.80 3.60 0.55
29 85 1.10 2.21 0.90
35 85 0.48 0.96 2.08
Francisella tularensis LVS
(culture medium with a wet
dissemination)
3.0  1010 CFU/ml 90 65.6a 131a 0.03 20, 21
80 1.91a 3.82a 1.20
70 1.10a 2.20a 2.09
60 0.28a 0.57a 8.00
50 0.24 0.48a 9.59
40 0.24 0.49a 9.39
30 0.25 0.50a 9.20
20 0.58a 1.16a 3.97
0 0.58a 1.17a 3.95
Francisella tularensis LVS
(freeze-dried in peptone
broth with a dry
dissemination)
3.0  1010 CFU/ml 90 0.37a 0.74a 6.15 20, 21
80 0.25 0.50a 9.20
70 0.29a 0.58a 7.83
60 0.34a 0.68a 6.71
50 0.37a 0.75a 6.09
40 0.55a 1.10a 4.18
30 0.57a 1.15a 4.00
20 1.76a 3.51a 1.31
0 1.91a 3.82a 1.20
Plague
Yersinia pestis A-1122 (HIBc
and/or 1% peptone)
2.0  109 cells/ml 26 87 0.29 0.57 3.49 94
26 50 0.48 0.95 2.10
26 20 0.38 0.75 2.66
Smallpox
Vaccinia virus (HIB) Not listed 10.5–11.5 20 275a 551a 0.00 40
10.5–11.6 50 123a 246a 0.00
10.5–11.7 80 47.2a 94.4a 0.02
21.0–23.0 20 30.7a 61.4a 0.03
21.0–23.1 50 26.5a 53.0a 0.03
21.0–23.2 80 7.70 15.4 0.13
31.0–33.5 20 30.9a 61.9a 0.03
31.0–33.6 50 8.63 17.3 0.11
Vaccinia virus (Mcllvaine buffer
with 1% horse serum)
Not listed 22 20 55.4a 111a 0.01 41
10 50 17.1 34.2a 0.05
10 80 10.8 21.6 0.09
HFd
Arenaviridae Venezuelan equine
encephalomyelitis virus (HIB)
1.0  1010 mouse IP
LD50/ml
9.0–9.5 19 146 291 0.00 40
9.0–9.5 48 36.8 73.7 0.02
9.0–9.5 86 19.5 39.0 0.05
21–23 19–23 21.9 43.8 0.04
21–23 50 9.53 19.1 0.10
21–23 81–86 8.06 16.1 0.12
20.5–23.5 19 11.0 21.9 0.09
20.5–23.5 48 4.38 8.76 0.22
20.5–23.5 81–85 1.16 2.32 0.86
Arenaviridae Lassa virus Josiah
strain (Eagle’s essential
medium with Earle’s salts and
fetal bovine serum)
6.3  106 PFU/ml 24 30 0.89 1.79a 1.12 81
24 55 0.92 1.85a 1.08
24 80 0.70 1.42a 1.41
32 30 1.47a 2.94a 0.68
32 55 1.67a 3.33a 0.60
32 80 1.79a 3.58a 0.55
38 30 1.68a 3.36a 0.59
Flaviviridae Japanese
encephalitis virus Peking
strain (HIB)
24 30 5.59a 11.2a 0.17 52
24 55 4.08a 8.15a 0.24
24 80 2.99a 5.97a 0.33
Flaviviridae St. Louis
encephalitis Parton strain
(bovine albumin, borate,
saline)
3.1  108 TCID50/ml 80 7.29 14.6 0.13 71
80 6.14 12.3 0.16
60 11.5 23.0 0.08
61 4.79 9.58 0.20
46 12.7 25.4a 0.07
46 10.7 21.5 0.09
35 25.6a 51.1a 0.03
23 1,438 2,875 0.001
Filoviridae Marburg virus
(found not to be stable in air)
3 7
a Estimated T90 and T99 are beyond the time measured in the study.
b PBS, phosphate buffer solution.
c HIB, heart infusion broth.
d HF, hemorrhagic fever.
e HPAC, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency’s hazard prediction and assessment capability.
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to rH (52), with longer survival times at lower levels. A study
on the St. Louis encephalitis virus, another major flavivirus,
found different results; no loss of titer was associated with
differences in rH (71).
Limited studies have verified the stability of hantavirus in
air, while epidemiological studies have characterized disease
transmission to humans as through wounds or inhalation of
aerosolized rodent excreta (78).
Fomites. Studies detailing the survival of category A agents
on fomites describe surface characteristics, rH, and tempera-
ture as major contributors to viability (Table 5) (9). Stainless
steel, polyethylene, glass, and paper were assessed for Y. pestis
survivability. It was found that these pneumonic plague bacte-
ria remained viable much longer on paper, potentially due to
surface roughness and hydrophobicity (75). The smallpox virus
was less sensitive to differences in surface and environment; it
remained viable for up to 2 weeks on fomites with various rH
values, temperatures, and surface textures (58). Three
Bunyaviridae hemorrhagic fever viruses, Hantaan virus, Sicilian
virus, and Crimean-Congo virus, showed various survival times
on aluminum discs, with the Sicilian fever virus exhibiting a T99
of up to 2.2 h (39).
Knowledge of survival of B. anthracis on fomites is fairly
limited. Several studies have revived spores dried on filter
paper after 35 and 41 years (67). Another study recovered
anthrax spores from canvas after 22 years (37).
Water. Most of the research on pathogen survival in water
has been on waterborne pathogens, i.e., those transmitted by
TABLE 5. Survival of category A biological agents on fomites
Disease and agent (exptl
conditions,
suspending medium titer
quantification)a
Initial titer Fomite Temp (°C) rH (%) T90b T99 Ki Reference
Tularemia
Francisella tularensis (LVS
in HIB CFU/surface)
1.7  107 Metal 25 100 7.70 15.4 0.13 91
1.0  107 65 15.1 30.2 0.07
7.0  106 10 87.6 175 0.01
3.5  106 37 100 2.22 4.43 0.46
4.0  106 80 2.60 5.21 0.38
2.3  106 65 2.68 5.37 0.37
3.1  106 55 3.98 7.96 0.25
Plague
Yersinia pestis A1122 (HIB
with 1% peptone CFU/
surface)
1.2  106 Metal 11 30 22.4 44.7 0.04 91
3.0  106 100 30 4.82 9.63 0.20
3.0  106 52 30 0.06 0.12 16.9
2.1  106 52 22 1.44 2.88 0.69
Yersinia pestis A1122 (PB
CFU/surface)
1.5  106 Stainless steel 18–22 55 1.01 2.02 0.98 75
Polyethylene 4.58 9.16 0.21
Glass 0.89 1.77 1.13
Paper 13.0 26.1 0.07
Yersinia pestis Harbin (PB
and HIB CFU/surface)
2.8  106 in PB Stainless steel 18–22 55 0.81 1.62 1.24 75
Polyethylene 1.10 2.20 0.91
Glass 1.17 2.35 0.85
Paper 3.87 7.75 0.25
6.1  106 in HIB Stainless steel 18–22 55 16.8 33.6 0.06
Polyethylene 15.0 30.1 0.06
Glass 13.6 27.2 0.07
Paper 23.6 47.2 0.04
Smallpox
Variola minor (from scabs
of infected individuals)
Scabs in envelopes
stored for up to
13 yr
15–30 35–98 1,491 days 2,983 days 2.79  105 93
Vaccinia virus (minimal
essential medium plus
cell culture medium)
1  107 CCID50c/
slide
Glass slides 25 96 155 311 6.43  103 58
25 55 101 201 9.95  103
25 7 156 312 6.41  103
37 93 183 367 5.45  103
37 55 145 291 6.87  103
37 3 160 320 6.25  103
HF
Bunyaviridae hantavirus
76-118 (minimal
essential medium
PFU/ml)
3.5  106 Aluminum discs 20 ? 1.45 2.91 0.68 39
Sicilian virus Sabin
(minimal essential
medium PFU/ml)
8.2  106 Aluminum discs 20 ? 1.41 2.82d 0.70 39
Crimean-Congo virus
(minimal essential
medium PFU/ml)
3.5  106 Aluminum discs 20 ? 1.08 2.16d 0.92 39
Filovirus Marburg Dried blood Stable 4–5 days 7
a PB, phosphate buffer solution; HIB, heart infusion broth; HF, hemorrhagic fever.
b Unless otherwise indicated, T values are in hours.
c CCID50, 50% cell culture infective dose.
d The estimated T99 is beyond the time measured in the study.
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TABLE 6. Survival of category A biological agents in water
Disease and agent (exptl
conditions, suspending medium) Initial titer Temp (°C) T90 T99 Ki Reference
Anthrax
Bacillus anthracis (freeze-dried
in glass bottles, heated in
glycol baths, and then
suspended in distilled H2O)
Not listed 100 3.69 7.38a 0.27 23, 24
90 13.2 26.4 0.07
80 62.5 125a 0.01
3 146 yra
Bacillus anthracis Pasteur (pH
7 buffer)
Not listed 70 1.94 3.88 0.52 66
80 0.14 0.28 7.06
90 0.01 0.03 69.8
Bacillus anthracis Pasteur
(milk)
70 3.42 6.84 0.29
80 0.26 0.52 3.82
90 0.02 0.03 60.0
Bacillus anthracis Pasteur (pH
4.5 buffer)
70 0.153 0.307 6.52
80 0.032 0.063 31.6
90 0.014 0.028 70.6
Bacillus anthracis Pasteur
(orange juice)
70 0.155 0.310 6.45
80 0.050 0.100 20.0
90 0.011 0.023 88.2
Bacillus anthracis Vollum (pH
7 buffer)
Not listed 70 3.78 7.56 0.26 66
80 0.498 0.997 2.01
90 0.082 0.163 12.2
Bacillus anthracis Vollum
(milk)
70 3.30 6.60 0.30
80 0.405 0.810 2.47
90 0.112 0.223 8.96
Bacillus anthracis Vollum (pH
4.5 buffer)
70 1.66 3.32 0.60
80 0.133 0.267 7.50
90 0.027 0.053 37.5
Bacillus anthracis Vollum
(orange juice)
70 1.36 2.72 0.73
80 0.127 0.253 7.89
90 0.033 0.067 30.0
Tularemia
Francisella tularensis (tap
water)
1  106/ml 8 28.7 daysa 33.7 daysa 3.9  103 32
Francisella tularensis (cell
culture medium with wet
dissemination)
3.7  1010 37 58.0 116 1.73  102 24
26 84.8 170 1.18  102
15 972 1,944 1.03  103
3 3,317 6,633 3.02  104
0 2,086 4,171 4.79  104
Francisella tularensis (freeze-
dried in peptone broth with
dry dissemination)
Not listed 37 162 325 6.16  103 24
27 642 1,284 1.56  103
15 3,924 7,848 2.55  104
3 26,154 52,309 3.82  105
18 56,552 113,104 1.77  105
Smallpox
Vaccinia virus (storm water) Not listed 4.5 29.8 daysa 59.5 daysa 1.40  103 29
19–23 72a 144a 1.39  102
Vaccinia virus (storm water
with fetal calf serum)
4.5 29.8 daysa 59.5 daysa 1.40  103 29
19–23 5 days 13.9 daysa 3.0  103
Vaccinia virus (storm water
and soil)
4.5 5 days 10 daysa 8.0  103 29
19–23 24 29 3.47  102
Vaccinia virus (tap water) 104–105/ml 9 110 to 150 days 170 to 200 days 1  103–2.8  103 60
15 No data 200 days 4.0  104
Vaccinia virus (river water/
seawater)
104–105/ml 9 110–120 days 200 days 1  103–3.4  103 60
15 110–160 days 190 to  200 days 1  103–2.6  103
Vaccinia virus (seawater) 4  105 11.5 281 562 3.56  103 8
Vaccinia virus (PBSb) 1  106 11.5 320 640 3.13  103 8
Hemorrhagic fever
Flaviviridae yellow fever virus
vaccine strain (0.9% saline)
1.8  106 37 39 96.0 1.40  102 2
Adenovirus (seawater) 1.2  104 6 355 710 2.82  103 8
Adenovirus (PBSb) 1  104 11.5 82.6 165 1.21  102 8
Bunyaviridae hantavirus (cell-
free medium)
3.5  106/ml 4 30 days 50 days 1.70  103 39
20 54 96 2.50  102
37 24 48 3.47  102
Bunyaviridae hantavirus 6.9  105/ml 23 6.5 daysa 13 daysa 6.40  103 49
4 34.7 daysa 69.4 daysa 1.20  103
23 15a 30a 6.50  102
4 15.7 daysa 31.4 daysa 2.60  103
Bunyaviridae Sicilian virus
(cell-free medium)
8.2  104/ml 4 150 days 325 days 1.00  104 39
20 16 days 32 days 2.60  103
37 6 days 10.7 days 1.19  102
a Estimated T90 and T99 are beyond the time measured in the study and/or extrapolated from a survival curve at high temperature. Unless otherwise indicated, T
values are in hours.
b PBS, phosphate buffer solution.
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the fecal oral route (Tables 6 and 7). Humans and animals are
the natural hosts of these pathogens, which normally cannot
replicate in the environment. Of all the category A select
agents, only B. anthracis and F. tularensis are capable of rep-
lication in the environment. However, all of the agents may be
excreted in the feces and urine; thus, they are likely to end up
in sewage systems or in water during recreational (34) activi-
ties. This appears to be the least studied area on environmental
survival of category A select agents.
Waterborne outbreaks of F. tularensis have been docu-
mented (38, 68, 87). F. tularensis type A has been isolated from
natural waters and mud contaminated by muskrats and beavers
(69), and the organisms may be capable of multiplication in
these environments (35, 69). F. tularensis type B has also been
isolated from surface waters, including drinking water supplies
(22, 83). An additional study found that the vaccine strain
could persist for at least 40 days at 8°C in tap water (32).
However, the organisms entered a viable but nonculturable
(VBNC) stage, and 65% of the original inoculum remained
viable after 140 days. The VBNC organisms were not capable
of causing tularemia in mice. The organism is also known to
replicate intracellularly in protozoa similarly to the water-
based pathogen Legionella, and this could act to serve as a
reservoir in aquatic environments or at least prolong its per-
sistence (1).
Y. pestis is also capable of transmission by inhalation of
aerosol (48). It has been reported to enter the VBNC state
when added to deionized water at 28 and 37°C (4) and may be
capable of persisting in cysts of amoebas (3). It was reported to
survive 16 days in tap water and well water (64) and has been
detected in sewage (31).
Early studies show that vegetative B. anthracis dies after only
72 h in distilled water (17) or has a maximum survival of 6 days
in water (64). There is a controversy as to the life cycle of B.
anthracis in water (26, 63, 88, 89). Contrarily, B. anthracis
spores can survive for a much longer time in water. Some
suggest that because large herbivores can become infected
through ingestion of spores at drying water holes in Africa, it
is possible that humans could also contract the illness via water
(19). Unfortunately, most information describing the longevity
of spores in water is from the early 1900s and lacks detailed
descriptions of procedures or lacks data on initial and final
concentrations. Recent data extrapolation calculates that B.
anthracis spores will survive for 620 years at room temperature;
however, this assumes a linear relation to survival at decreasing
temperatures (23, 24). There are also data on spore survival in
water for species taxonomically close to B. anthracis, and this
information can be used to extrapolate the behavior of B.
anthracis (64, 80); however, actual experimental evidence using
B. anthracis is very limited. Table 7 shows some of the limited
data available on B. anthracis survival.
Hantavirus is excreted in the urine and saliva of rodents and
may contaminate water, although waterborne transmission is
unproven. A recent study investigated the survival of hantavi-
rus and related arthropod-borne members of the Bunyaviridae
family in cell culture media at various temperatures (39). A
99.9% decrease in virus titer at 20°C required about 20 days.
The most stable of the viruses studied was the Sicilian virus,
carried by the sand fly; this virus showed little inactivation after
10 days at 20°C.
Data on the stability of smallpox virus come largely from
studies of scabs, vesicles, and bodily fluids (29, 93). Most of the
useful studies have been conducted with vaccinia virus, a ge-
netically related virus in the smallpox vaccine. The genus
Orthopoxvirus is a very stable group of viruses. Little is known
about the stability of the arenaviruses and flaviviruses in water
or other liquids because they are not known to be naturally
transmitted by this route. The flavivirus yellow fever virus,
when reconstituted from a vaccine, was able to survive for
several days at 37°C (2).
Soil. Bacillus species spores have been found and revived
from sediments perhaps as old as 1,000 years and some have
claimed from Paleozoic salt beds (80). Viable spores of B.
anthracis have been found after 40 years on Gruinard Island
(59), and Lewis reported on recovered viable spores from
sealed soil samples stored for 60 and 68 years (56). As soil
is part of the organism’s ecological life cycle, it is expected
that spores persist in particular types of soil for many years,
where they may germinate and multiply (26, 88, 89). Table 7
shows that some spores can remain viable in soil for many
decades.
Soil moisture and organic matter content are important to
the survival of Y. pestis. In soil, Y. pestis may multiply under
favorable soil conditions and will survive for more than 10
months in soil at 4 to 8°C and for 3.5 months at room temper-
ature (13, 14, 64).
TABLE 7. Nonkinetic studies on survival of Bacillus anthracis
(virulent strains) in the environment
Medium Exptl condition Survival Reference
Aerosol Silk string 4 yr 17
Silk string 8–10 yr 17
Silk string 12 yr 17
Silk string 17 yr 17
Silk string 71 yr 64
Open air No death
overnight
61
Water Pond water 2 yr 64
Milk 10 yr 64
Sewage 16 mo 79
Distilled water 20 mo 79
Seawater 20 mo 79
Pond water 18 yr 63
Fomite Paper filter 35 yr 67
Paper filter 41 yr 67
Dry spores from
desiccated culture
17 yr 17
Dry spores from
desiccated culture
18 yr 84
Dry spores, canvas 22 yr for no
growth
37
Dry spores, canvas 3 mo 50%
decrease
37
Soil Moist soil 33 mo 79
Dry soil 33 mo 79
Soil, cadaver 15 yr 37
Gravel, cadaver 20 yr 37
Soil, cadaver 12 yr 37
Sealed soil 60–68 yr 56
Gruinard Island soil 40 yr 59
Sealed soil 60 yr 92
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DISCUSSION
Exposure is critical to estimating the risk posed by pathogens
capable of environmental transmission and creates the greatest
amount of uncertainty in estimating the risk of infection to
exposed populations (34). Models can be developed to predict
exposure after the release of a pathogen in the environment,
but die-off or decay rates are critical in this estimation. To have
the greatest utility, die-off rates (Ki) need to be as quantitative
as possible. This review reveals that information appears to be
very limited for select agents in category A. Because no inves-
tigators have appeared to use similar methods, data compari-
son between groups of organisms is of limited value. The de-
velopment of standardized testing methods and conditions for
assessing survival would be of the most value. Consideration
must also be given to the usual multiphasic die-off rates, or
otherwise they may be underestimated. For example, die-off of
organisms is usually most rapid during aerosolization or drying
on fomites.
With the limited database, it is difficult to make generaliza-
tions; however, it appears overall that the greatest stability of
the select agents was seen for liquid environments (Table 6)
and the least for aerosols. Desiccation during aerosolization
and drying on fomites were major factors contributing to the
steep initial die-off trends for fomite and aerosol environ-
ments. The viruses were generally more stable in aerosols than
were the other agents, except for the spores of B. anthracis. F.
tularensis was the most stable non-spore-forming organism in
water, reflecting its potential to grow in this environment.
Vaccinia virus and B. anthracis were the most environmentally
stable agents overall.
The available data would suggest that the greater long-
term exposure to agents once released into the environment
would be from water or fomites. In these media, agents will
persist longer than in aerosols and present the greater haz-
ard. Also, aerosols are usually only a transitory medium for
these agents in nature, as the organisms quickly settle out.
The potential for resuspension into the aerosol state is
largely governed by the potential for survival on a fomite or
in a liquid that may be aerosolized. Overall, further survival
studies need to be conducted on all category A select agents
within the context of human exposure to liquid, soil, fomites,
and aerosols.
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